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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1960
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
BY KENNETH N. KRIPKE
Mr. Kripke is an attorney practicing in the Denver area.
1959 was another prolific year in the tort field. It was also a
rather confusing year of ups and downs for litigants and their
lawyers; a year in which the court took its tort cases most seriously,
rendering numerous, carefully-detailed and well-documented
opinions. In reflecting on these cases it seems that a few decisions




Upon its own motion on the ground of error, mis-
take or a change in condition, the commission . . . at any
time within two years after the date last payment becomes
due and payable or within six years from the date of acci-
dent, whichever is longer, in cases where compensation has
been paid . . . may review any award and on such review,
may make an award ending, diminishing, maintaining, or
increasing compensation previously awarded .... No such
review shall affect such award as regards any moneys al-
ready paid.'
The Supreme Court had occasion to construe this statute in the
case of University of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n.2 This case is
a sequel to University of Denver v. Nemeth3 wherein it was
held that one who played football for a university was covered
by workmen's compensation where his employment in other part-
time work for the university was dependent upon his participation
in athletics. The instant case was spawned when Nemeth petitioned
the commission to reopen in December, 1957, on the ground that
his condition had changed. Following the first case he had been
granted a lump sum settlement in October of 1954 for his injuries
which were incurred in April of 1950. The petition to reopen thus
was filed more than six years after the date of accident and con-
siderably more than two years from the date on which he received
his lump sum settlement. In affirming the trial court's decision
ordering the commission to reopen the claimant's case, the Supreme
Court held that it was the intention of the legislature that the claim
could be reopened within two years after the last periodic payment
would have been made had there not been a lump sum settlement.
The happy result of this case, therefore, is that a claimant does not
prejudice his position with reference to a later petition to reopen
by accepting a lump sum settlement rather than periodic payments.
Snyder v. Industrial Comm'n4 posed the question: Who is
the employer? Snyder, an unlicensed cement contractor, obtained
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. 6 81-14-19 (1953).
" 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959).
3 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
4 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959).
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a contract for sidewalks and entered into an agreement with Dillie,
who was a licensed cement contractor, that the two would work
together, each using his employees, dividing the costs and profits.
Dillie obtained the sidewalk permit and it was he who stamped his
name on the walk as required by law. Lopez, the injured claimant,
was in the general employ of Snyder but on the day he was injured
he was receiving his orders from Dillie. The court held that Dillie
and Snyder were engaged in a joint enterprise and therefore Lopez
was an employee of both, thus holding them jointly responsible for
the injuries to Lopez. It is noted in the decision that Snyder carried
no workmen's compensation insurance but Dillie was covered.
In Industrial Comm'n v. Johnson Pontiac, Inc.5 there is evi-
dence that the employer reported to the commission that the
claimant "strained or pulled his heart muscle when attempting to
lift a transmission into an automobile." The insurer filed a general
admission of liability and paid temporary compensation. A hearing
was subsequently held to determine the extent of permanent dis-
ability following which the insurer asked leave to withdraw its
admission. The insurer claimed that the admission was based upon
a mistake of fact on the part of the employer and that it had no
support in the record. The commission denied the motion and
entered an award for permanent disability. The district court
reversed the award and directed dismissal of the claim. The
Supreme Court reversed again, reinstating the claim, and anchored
its opinion on the following grounds: (1) The insurance company
was fully aware of the facts, and, therefore, its contention that
there was a mistake of fact had no support in the record; and (2)
there was sufficient medical evidence in the record to establish
the reasonable probability that the claimant's injury was causally
connected with his work. A doctor's report in evidence stated that
the injury "undoubtedly" occurred while the claimant was pushing
in a transmission, and that the symptoms noted by the claimant at
that time probably m a r k e d the very beginning of a coronary
occlusion. In addition, the employer's report contained an admission
against interest "having probative value the weight of which was
for the consideration of the commission." The commission having
determined the issue upon competent evidence, its conclusion is
binding upon the courts.
In Divelbiss v. Industrial Comm'nO a divided court held that
where a helper on an open hearth furnace in a steel mill was in-
jured while showering after work but before he "punched out"
and it appeared that the claimant had worked in dense heat and
dolemite dust and that the shower was provided by the employer
but that its use was optional, the act of showering was the perform-
ance of services arising out of and in the course of employment.
The majority of the court applied the test set forth in Industrial
Comm'n v. Golden Cycle Corp.7 : " [I] t arises out of the employment
if it is connected with the nature, conditions, operations, or inci-
dents of the employment...."
5 344 P.2d 186 (Colo. 1959).
6 344 P.2d 1084 (Colo. 1959).
7 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d 902, 904 (1952).
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The court expressly rejected the contrary decision in Industrial
Comm'n v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. 8 as being out of harmony
with the modern trend. The majority of the court observed:
The fact that the employer has provided these showers
and the fact that substantially all of the employees find it
necessary to use them, constitutes persuasive evidence lead-
ing to the conclusion that the shower facilities provided are
something more than a contribution to the convenience of
the employees. The health of the employee is of interest to
the employer and the inference that the employer was not
providing for the comfort and pleasure of the employee
when it installed these extensive shower facilities is a fair
one. The employers interest was actually here served.9
The dissent noted that the claimant was not working by the
hour but by the ton, and that showering is just a matter of personal
taste. Therefore he was not performing services for his employer
when injured; "taking a bath," the minority tells us, "had nothing
to do with tending the furnace . "... 10
This writer is moved by the humor of Professor Larson1
wherein he criticised the Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. case on the basis





Hennigar v. Van Every13 is another in a long chain of unfortu-
nate examples of the fact-finding process to which the courts must
resort in construing cases under the Colorado Guest Statute. 14
This vague and confusing statute continues to clutter judicial
literature, the courts endlessly disagreeing on whether a case falls
on this side of an imaginary line or on the other.15 The ridiculous
cost of the guest statute in terms of time and legal brains alone is
a powerful argument for its repeal. No lawyer ever seems to be
able to predict the outcome of a guest staute case and no verdict
either way seems safe until after the Supreme Court has spoken.
Mr. Hennigar was killed while a guest in an automobile driven
by Mr. Van Every. The defendant sped down a dark and unfamiliar
road ignoring signs warning him of dangerous road conditions and
disregarding oncoming traffic. He drove across a one-lane bridge
without reducing his speed although there was a car approaching
from the opposite direction. His car struck the bridge railing, then
struck the front of an approaching truck and overturned. Un-
doubtedly the trial court relied on the language of Pettingell v.
Moede16 which told us that the word "willful" in the guest statute
connotes intentional. It directed a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant. Somehow the Supreme Court drew a fine line deciding that
8 107 Colo. 226, 110 P.2d 654 (1941).
9 344 P.2d at 1087.
10 344 P.2d at 1088.
11 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation 315 (1952).
12 344 P.2d at 1087.
13 337 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1959).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-9-1 (1953).
15 See discussion at 35 DICTA 182 (1958).
16 129 Colo. 484, 491, 271 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1954).
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Van Every's conduct was willful because the danger was obvious
and Van Every had knowledge of it. The horrendous Pettingell case
was not mentioned in the decision.
There will be no certainty of the interpretation of the guest
statute as long as there are human beings on the court. Guest
cases will continue to be appealed wherever and whenever the
losing party has the funds to do so. It is to be hoped that the Su-
preme Court will soon have an opportunity to attack the problem
of the constitutionality of the statute as that problem was raised in
Noakes v. Gaiser.
17
Houghtaling v. Davis" holds that where there is a regular
weekly payment for transportation to work even though it be a
small payment, the passenger is not a guest under the meaning of
the statute and the driver is therefore responsible for injuries
resulting to the passenger from the driver's ordinary negligence.
The court further observed that since the guest statute is a matter
of affirmative defense and is in derogation of the common law,
the burden of establishing such a defense is upon the driver. It is
therefore unnecessary for the plaintiff to plead or prove that the
action lies outside the statute.
Bridges v. Lintz1" further clarifies the matter of payment for
transportation. In that case, instead of an actual money payment as
in the Houghtaling case, there was a car-pool arrangement whereby
the plaintiff and the defendant drove their own cars on alternate
days. The court held that the relationship was nevertheless an
impersonal one based upon expediency and mutual benefit and
therefore the guest statute was not applicable.
B. Expert Witnesses
In Bridges v. Lintz2 0 a police officer testified that he observed
ice on the street, that the street was designated as a detour, that it
was black top, that the car had spun around, and that he saw
thirty-five feet of side-sliding marks. Based upon these observa-
tions the officer was permitted to testify that excessive speed plus
icy conditions and loss of control of the car caused the collision
of the car with a post. The court observed that even though this
conclusion of the officer clearly invaded the province of the jury,
it was nevertheless proper since the officer was qualified by his
experience and training to judge the matter of speed. The jury
was properly instructed that it could reject or accept the officer's
opinion or could give limited weight to it. Thus the court reaffirmed
the liberal view taken in Ferguson v. Hurford2" wherein a patrol-
man was permitted to testify that greatly excessive speed was
evidenced by skid marks.
C. Experiment
The court declared in Kling v. City and County of Denver22
that it is within the trial court's sound discretion to admit into
evidence testimony of a police officer's experiment in which he
17 136 Colo. 73, 77, 315 P.2d 183, 185 (Colo. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
18344 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1959).
1i' 346 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1959).
20 Ibid.
21 132 Colo. 507, 290 P.2d 229 (1955).
22 138 Colo. 567, 335 P.2d 876 (1959).
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drove over the roadway at an automobile crash scene three or four
days after the crash to determine whether the condition of the
street was reasonably safe for general vehicular traffic. The court
stated that such a test is properly to be considered in connection
with other evidence. The officer drove a police car; the vehicle
involved in the crash was sixteen years old. It was claimed the
steering mechanism had broken because of ruts in the road.
D. Imputed Negligence
Swanson v. McQuown 23 clarified a point which has been par-
ticularly troublesome. The plaintiff, a sergeant in the United
States Army, was a passenger in a military vehicle driven by a
corporal. They were on duty as military police. The plaintiff was
listening for radio calls. The corporal drove into an uncontrolled
intersection taking the right of way from the defendant who was
approaching from the right. The plaintiff brought an action for
his injuries against the driver of the other car, alleging negligence.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant because
he had not so driven his vehicle as to lose the right of way.
Reversing the trial court and returning the case for a new trial,
the Supreme Court observed that the question of whether or not
the defendant was negligent was broader than the simple matter
of right of way; that the evidence raised a jury question as to
whether or not the defendant might have violated the ordinance
on careless driving by entering the intersection at a rate of speed
which might have been imprudent under the blind conditions
existing there.
The court held that the negligence of the corporal could not
be imputed to the plaintiff despite his higher rank, adopting with
approval the Restatement position24 that imputation of negligence
depends on whether the plaintiff himself would have been liable
to a third person for the tort. Likening the position of the sergeant-
plaintiff to that of a public officer, the court pointed out that a
public officer is not liable for the negligence of his subordinate
unless he cooperates in the act complained of or directs or encour-
ages it. Since the plaintiff is not barred by the fact that the cor-
poral took the right of way, there is an issue of fact for the jury
as to whether or not the defendant drove negligently despite the
fact that he did not lose the right of way.
23 340 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1959).






Another extremely important case in the field of imputed
negligence is Seal v. Lemmel. 25 Seal, a coroner, procured a ride
in a sheriff's car for personal reasons. The deputy sheriff who was
driving received a radio call pertaining to a hold-up and was
instructed to proceed as an emergency. Seal knew that this meant
that he would drive at a very high rate of speed. He had an
opportunity to leave the car before the deputy began the emergency
run but said that he didn't wish to do so because he would have
to walk a mile and a half to his destination.
The car was speeding on a busy street at night with its head-
lights and a red light on. The driver was intermittently operating
a siren, and in addition, was flashing a white spotlight on approach-
ing cars to determine whether the hold-up get-away car might be
among them. The deputy testified that he last sounded his siren
about three-tenths of a mile from the crash scene. The defendant
was driving in the opposite direction on the same street and made
a left turn directly in front of the deputy's car. The defendant and
an eyewitness both testified they did not hear the siren.
The court instructed the jury that any negligence of the
deputy sheriff would be imputed to the plaintiff. This was held
error by the Supreme Court which observed that there was no evi-
dence that the plaintiff was aiding the driver, or that he was his
employer, or that he was in control of the vehicle, or that there was
a joint enterprise. Therefore, under the rule of Swanson v. Mc-
Quown,26 it was error to submit to the jury the question as to
whether or not the deputy sheriff was negligent. Such negligence
would not be imputable.
It was held that the trial court compounded its error by ask-
ing the jury to determine whether or not the plaintiff under the
facts had voluntarily assumed the risk of the collision by continuing
to ride in the sheriff's vehicle when he had an opportunity to leave
before the emergency run began. The Supreme Court observed that
there may have been a question of voluntary assumption of risk
in an action between the coroner and deputy sheriff but as between
the plaintiff coroner and the driver of the other vehicle, the plain-
tiff assumed no risk; therefore, the doctrine of assumption of risk
had no place in the law suit. Nor did the Supreme Court believe
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence merely
because he did not reject the opportunity for transportation to his
destination. In this regard the court cited Jacobsen v. McGinness
27
as follows: "To say that in such circumstances Jacobsen was con-
tributorily negligent would be to say that he should not have been
on that road at that time in the morning, or better still, should have
stayed at home."
E. Head-On Collision
According to the testimony in Bird v. Richardson2 the plain-
tiff driver saw the defendant approaching on the wrong side of
the road at a high rate of speed some distance away. The plaintiff
25 344 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959).
26 340 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1959).
27 135 Colo. 357, 362, 311 P.2d 696, 699 (1957).
28 344 P.2d 957 (Colo. 1959).
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continued to drive in his own lane without reducing speed. He
said that he assumed the oncoming car would return to its proper
lane. At a point about 100 to 150 feet from the point of impact, the
defendant started a side skid whereupon the plaintiff attempted
to drive into the drainage ditch on his right to avoid a collision.
He was evidently a split second too late because his left rear fender
was struck by the left rear fender of the defendant's car. At the
close of all the evidence the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict in
his favor, which motion was denied by the court. Verdict and
judgment for the defendant resulted. In reversing the trial court,
the Supreme Court held that a directed verdict should have been
granted. The court said that it was error to submit the question of
contributory negligence to the jury under circumstances wherein
the freedom of action of the plaintiff was so limited. The driver
could not be expected, observed the court, to immediately leave
the roadway and drive into a ditch to avoid a collision which might
not occur if the opposing driver returned to his proper lane of
traffic. The plaintiff cannot be charged with negligence in failing
to anticipate that the defendant will continue to drive on the
wrong side of the road when it appears that the defendant may
return to his own lane in time. Nor does the unwise choice .of
alternatives open the plaintiff to the charge of contributory negli-
gence. If the plaintiff turns left who knows but what the defendant
might return to his own lane? If the plaintiff continues in his own
lane so might the defendant. If the plaintiff heads for the ditch on
the right side, might not the defendant do the same? The dilemma
of the plaintiff is a direct result of the negligence of the defendant
and his decision even though wrong does not form the basis for a
charge to the jury on the question of contributory negligence.
F. Defective Brakes
In Eddy v. McAninch29 the defendant admittedly drove
through a red light striking a car in which the plaintiff was riding
as a passenger. The defendant testified that he had owned the car
only about a week; that it was supplied with an inspection sticker
when he bought it; that he had no advance notice of the brakes
being inoperative; that as he attempted to stop for the light the
brakes failed. The investigating officer arrived at the scene minutes
after the collision, tested the brakes, and found that they were not
then operating. The service manager of the firm from which the
car was purchased said that the brakes were good when the car
was sold and that he had personally examined and tested them
the morning after the collision at which time they were operating.
A brake and wheel shop tested the brakes a few days later and
found them to be in good condition. There was testimony that a
brake failure can happen suddenly and unexpectedly by reason of
dirt becoming lodged in a valve of the master cylinder. The court
submitted the issue of the defendant's negligence to the jury and
a verdict in favor of the defendant resulted. The plaintiff claimed
that her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should
have been granted. A Colorado statute" requires that automobiles
29 347 P.2d 499 (Colo. 1959).
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-105 (1953).
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shall be equipped with brakes adequate to stop the car within
certain prescribed distances and that these brakes shall be main-
tained in good working order. The plaintiff contended that the
collision was proximately caused by the defendant's failure to
comply with that statute. The Supreme Court, however, held that
such violation as well as violation of the statute on signal lights
merely raised a rebuttable presumption and that there remained
a jury question as to whether the defendant had met the burden
of disproving his negligence. Query: Would it not be better for
the court to require the defendant to prove the presence of dirt
in the master cylinder rather than to allow him to escape on
testimony to the effect that there "might have been"?
G. Child In Street
In Cornell v. Deuser31 the three-year-old plaintiff was struck
by an automobile driven by the defendant. The defendant testified
that she did not see the plaintiff in the street before the impact.
The court instructed the jury that, ". . . a person driving upon the
highway is entitled in the absence of actual knowledge to the
contrary, to assume that it is safe to proceed on said highway at
a lawful speed.
'32
Holding this instruction to be error, the court observed that
the requirement of "actual knowledge" would relieve the driver
of the necessity of using reasonable and ordinary care to observe
the presence of children in the street or to observe any other cir-
cumstance which would put him on notice that a dangerous situa-
tion was presented. The court in reversing the case and remanding
it for a new trial declared, "The motorist is bound to know that
which a reasonable person would ascertain by the exercise of
ordinary care. '33
H. Elderly Pedestrian
In Allison v. Trustee,34 the plaintiff, an eighty-year-old woman,
was attempting to cross U. S. Highway 24 at the western edge of
Simla when she was struck by the defendant's car. The court in-
structed the jury that there was neither a marked nor unmarked
crosswalk at the place where the impact occurred and that the
pertinent Colorado statutes 35 provided: "Every pedestrian cross-
ing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the
right of way to all vehicles on the roadway."
In another instruction the jury was told that violation of a
statute is negligence in and of itself.
The court refused to include in its instructions another section
of the same statuteO6 which provided in essence that notwithstand-
ing the provisions of subsection (1), drivers shall use due care to
avoid colliding with pedestrians and shall exercise proper care
31 347 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1959).
32 Id. at 965.
33 Ibid.
34 344 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959).
35 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4.59(1) (1953).
36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-59(4) (1959).
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upon observing children or confused or incapacitated persons on the
road.
At the pre-trial conference the defendants had admitted the
truth of the plaintiff's allegation that the plaintiff was crossing in
in a crosswalk.
From a verdict and judgment for the defendant the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court held that it was error not to tell
the jury about the degree of care required of drivers under sub-
section (4) and stated that the trial court erred in giving to the
jury an instruction that the plainiff was not in a crosswalk in the
face of the defendant's pre-trial stipulation.
III. DAMAGES
In Jones v. Franklin,31 a case involving an assault and battery
by a police officer, the court held that the jury could properly con-
sider the following elements in assessing the plaintiff's damages:
fear, anxiety, indignity, disgrace, physical injuries, nervous shock,
pain, suffering, medical expenses, and loss of earnings.
IV. SLIP AND FALL
King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell,"8 is a milestone among slip and
fall cases. The defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff arising out of a fall which occurred on the defendant's
parking lot adjoining its grocery store. In determining whether
the grocery had a duty to clear the parking lot of ice and snow, the
court was impressed with the argument that the plaintiff was
carrying a sack of groceries which he had just purchased at the
store; that this made it difficult for him to see the ground; that the
company should have been able to foresee the likelihood of injury
to a shopper who must carry packages across the lot to his car. The
court held that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence
were properly submitted to the jury.
37 340 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1959).
38 342 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1959).
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